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1                                                                                       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 03-4058
            
KENNETH R. ALLISON,
          Appellant
v.
JO ANNE BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security
                               
          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(Dist. Ct. No. 02-01370)
District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone
         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 14, 2004
Before: NYGAARD, MCKEE and CHERTOFF, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 8, 2004)
         
OPINION
         
CHERTOFF, Circuit Judge.
2Kenneth R. Allison appeals from the District Court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for a period of disability and
Disability Insurance Benefits under Sections 216(i) and 223 of the Social Security Act
(“Act”).  Allison’s appeal essentially challenges the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”)
finding at step four of the five-step evaluation process promulgated by the Social
Security Administration to determine whether an individual is disabled.  See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520.  At step four, the ALJ concluded that Allison retained the residual functional
capacity to perform “light work,” with noted restrictions.  For the reasons stated below,
we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I.
Allison was born on January 10, 1959.  He has a high school education and past
relevant work experience as an automobile radiator repairman.  In his brief, Allison
claims that he was injured in two separate accidents.  In the spring of 1997, he sustained
unresolved back and neck injuries as a result of a motor vehicle accident.  In mid-July of
1998, Allison suffered an umbilical hernia while lifting a radiator at work.  Allison filed
his first claim for disability benefits on November 12, 1999, claiming that he had “scar
tissue in groin area due to double hernia and surgery, high blood pressure, [and]
depression” and that “I have constant pain in the groin.”  Tr. at 125.  This claim was
denied on March 13, 2000, and Allison did not seek review of that claim.   
In July of 2000, Allison filed a second application for disability insurance
3benefits.  In this present application, Allison claims that he had “pain in groin, lower
back and neck.”  Tr. at 148.  This application was initially denied, and a request for
hearing was timely filed.  Allison, represented by counsel, appeared before the ALJ on
March 14, 2002.  On April 20, 2002, the ALJ rendered a decision concluding that
Allison was not disabled under the Act.  On July 23, 2002, the Appeals Council denied
Allison’s request to review the ALJ’s decision.
Allison sought judicial review of the adverse decision, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  On
September 3, 2003, the Honorable David S. Cercone granted the Commissioner’s motion
for summary judgment and denied Allison’s cross-motion for summary judgment.  This
appeal followed.
II.
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and
appellate jurisdiction is vested in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The role of this
Court is identical to that of the District Court; we must determine whether there is
substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision.  Plummer v. Apfel, 186
F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999).   Substantial evidence means “‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”  Jesurum v. Sec’y of
the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).  “It is less than a preponderance of the
4evidence but more than a mere scintilla.”  Id.  Overall, the substantial evidence standard
is a deferential standard of review.  Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d
429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). 
The Social Security Administration has promulgated a five-step evaluation process
to determine whether an individual is disabled.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see generally
Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428.  In step one, the Commissioner decides whether the claimant
is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity.  If so, the claimant is not eligible for
disability benefits.  20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) & (b).  In step two, the Commissioner
determines  whether the claimant is suffering from a severe impairment.  If the
impairment is not “severe,” the claimant is not eligible for disability benefits.  20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(c).   In step three, the Commissioner evaluates whether the evidence establishes
that the claimant suffers from a listed impairment.  If so, the claimant is automatically
eligible for benefits.  If the claimant does not suffer from a listed impairment or its
equivalent, however, the Commissioner proceeds to the next step.  20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(d).  In step four, the Commissioner examines the claimant’s “residual
functional capacity,” and whether such capacity enables her to perform her past relevant
work.  If so, the claimant is not eligible for disability benefits.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). 
Finally, in step five the Commissioner considers whether work exists in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform given her medical
impairments, age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity.  If
5so, the claimant is not eligible for benefits.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).  In this final step,
“the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner, who must demonstrate the claimant
is capable of performing other available work in order to deny a claim of disability.” 
Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428.  
The issues on appeal arise from the ALJ’s determination at step four that Allison
had the residual functional capacity to perform light work.
III.
Allison argues (1) that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding
that he had the residual functional capacity to perform light work activity; (2) that the
ALJ accorded inadequate weight to the reports of his treating physicians; and (3) that
substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding that Allison was not fully
credible. 
First, we disagree with Allison’s allegation that the ALJ’s conclusions are not
supported by substantial evidence.  The ALJ considered numerous medical records in
rendering his decision, including records and treatment pages from Drs. Daljit Singh,
Kevin O. Garrett, Doris K. Cope, Richard B. Kasdan, and Malcolm Harris; physical
therapy records demonstrating improvement in Allison’s condition; and Allison’s
description of his daily activities.  Like the District Court, we are satisfied that the ALJ’s
decision provides sufficient evidence to support his assessment of Allison’s residual
functional capacity to perform a modified range of light work.  
6Next, we reject Allison’s second contention that the ALJ did not accord adequate
weight to his treating physicians, Drs. Singh and Garrett, for substantially the same
reasons as outlined by the District Court.  The ALJ provided sufficient details as to why
he found their opinions to be inconsistent with their own clinical and objective findings. 
Tr. at 29-30.  While this Court has acknowledged that “greater weight should be given to
the findings of a treating physician than to a physician who has examined the claimant as
a consultant . . . [,] a statement by a plaintiff’s treating physician that [h]e is ‘disabled’ or
‘unable to work’ is not dispositive.”  Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 47-48 (3d Cir.
1994).  Rather, “the ALJ must weigh the relative worth of a treating physician’s report
against the reports submitted by other physicians who have examined the claimant.”  Id.
at 48; see also Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991) (concluding ALJ
correctly determined opinions of treating physicians were not controlling).
Allison’s third allegation is that the ALJ erred in finding his testimony not to be
credible.  We similarly reject this argument in light of the substantial evidence cited by
the ALJ in his review of Allison’s residual functional capacity.  An ALJ may reject a
claim of disabling pain where "he [has] consider[ed] the subjective pain and specif[ied]
his reasons for rejecting these claims and [has] support[ed] his conclusion with medical
evidence in the record."  Matullo v. Bowen, 926 F.2d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 1990).  Finally,
we find no credence in Allison’s claim that the ALJ acted inappropriately when he asked
Dr. David Barnhouse, the testifying medical expert, “in your judgment, is the claimant’s
7testimony regarding his symptoms consistent with the evidence in the record?”  App. at
54.  Allison cites to no legal authority that suggests that such questioning is
inappropriate.  Indeed, the ALJ’s question is entirely proper under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529,
which states that in determining whether an individual is disabled, “we consider all of
your symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which your symptoms can reasonably
be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.”  20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) (2004) (emphasis added).  
IV.
We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and conclude
that no further discussion is necessary.  Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court
will be affirmed.
            
